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INTRODUCTION
Peer sexual violence'-when one student sexually harasses another in a
* Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University Beasley School of Law;
B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. My
thanks to Drs. Bonnie S. Fisher and John J. Sloan, III, for first prompting me to
write the original version of this article as a chapter of the third edition of Campus
Crime: Legal, Social and Policy Perspectives, forthcoming from Charles C
Thomas in 2012. In addition, I thank Professor Robin West for first suggesting
"decriminalizing" as a unifying term for my recommendations regarding campus
responses to peer sexual violence, as well as for her overall contributions-too
numerous to list here-to my work in this and so many other areas. Finally, I send
additional thanks to Carolyn Wylie, Professor Laurie Kohn, Professor Steve
Goldblatt, and the many colleagues and students from my days directing
Georgetown University's Women's Center for helping to set me on this research
path and contributing so much to my perspectives on the issues.
This book excerpt first appeared in 38 J.C. & U.L. 483 (2012).
1. This Article updates and unifies more extensive discussions regarding
specific aspects of how institutions of higher education should respond to campus
peer sexual violence as both a legal and policy matter. Those more extensive
discussions may be found at Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the
Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of
Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205 (2011), available at:
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1829425, and Nancy Chi
Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary Through the
Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613 (2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol
3 /
papers.cfm?abstract id=1457343.
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manner that includes physical contact2-is an epidemic on campuses across
the nation. Between twenty and twenty-five percent of college and
university women are victims of attempted or completed nonconsensual sex
during their time at college or university, 3 overwhelmingly at the hands of
2. A note about language: Other than when I am discussing studies or other
sources that use terms such as "sexual assault" or "rape," I use "sexual violence"
instead of terms such as "sexual assault" or "rape" because in my view "sexual
violence" is a broader, more descriptive term that is not a term of art, and which I
regard to include a wider range of actions that may not fit certain legal or readers'
definitions of "sexual assault" or "rape." The term therefore includes "sexual
assault" or "rape," as well as other actions involving physical contact of a sexual
nature (while I acknowledge that non-physical actions can constitute violence,
including those forms of violence is beyond the scope of this article). When I am
discussing studies or other sources that use terms such as "sexual assault" or
"rape," I retain use of those terms as the original researchers and authors used
them.
Similarly, my definition of "report" and "reporting" is not a technical one. I
regard a report as any time a victim discloses the violence to any professional with
any role or authority to help victims, including but not limited to medical,
counseling, security or conduct-related, residential life or other student affairs
personnel, as well as faculty and community or campus advocates.
In addition, I use "victim" and "survivor" interchangeably to refer to people
who say that they have been victims of sexual violence. Therefore, "victim" is
again not a term of art used to indicate a finding of responsibility for sexual
violence. I use "perpetrator" or "assailant" when someone accused of sexual
violence has been found responsible or in discussions where it can be assumed the
person perpetrated the sexual violence, such as statistical analyses. I use "accused"
or "alleged" to indicate when I am referring to those who have been charged but
not found responsible for committing sexual violence and "accuser" when
discussing the role of the victim/survivor in a disciplinary proceeding. Because
studies confirm that the majority of victims are women and the majority of
perpetrators and accused students are men, I use female pronouns to refer to
victims and male pronouns to refer to perpetrators and accused students.
Finally, I use "school" and "institution" to identify either K-12 schools or
higher education institutions, although I also use "college," "university,"
"campus," or "higher education" to refer to the latter category of schools.
3. Brenda J. Benson et al., College Women and Sexual Assault: The Role of
Sex-related Alcohol Expectancies, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 341, 348 (2007);
CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY: FINAL
REPORT, 5-3 (Nat'l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding that nineteen percent
of students in the sample had experienced attempted or completed sexual assault
since entering college, but noting that over fifty percent of the sample had
completed less than two years of college and therefore discussing the incidence
reported by college seniors, where twenty-six percent had experienced attempted
or completed sexual assault since entering college, to predict a woman's risk
during her overall college career). See also BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL, THE SEXUAL
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someone they know.4 Moreover, college and university women are
particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, since "[w]omen ages 16 to 24
experience rape at rates four times higher than the assault rate of all
women... [and] [c]ollege women are more at risk for rape and other forms
of sexual assault than women the same age but not in college."5 Six to
approximately fifteen percent of college and university men "report acts
that meet legal definitions for rape or attempted rape,"6 and a small number
of repeat perpetrators commit most of the sexual violence and likely
contribute to other violence problems as well.7 College and university men
can also be victims of sexual violence, but because so few male victims
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf; CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL
ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 6 (Lexington Books
1993). Although some of the studies that are cited here are somewhat old, they are
included because the findings of the older studies are quite consistent with the most
recent ones, even when the studies have been conducted in different decades. This
indicates that the findings of older studies are still valid in terms of what we see
today.
4. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 26. See also KREBS ET AL., supra
note 3, at 5-18; FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 17.
5. See RANA SAMPSON, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE SERIES NO. 17,
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 2 (2003), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf. But see KATRINA BAUM & PATSY
KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION
OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1995-2002, at 3 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf (finding that college students were less
likely to be the victim of sexual assault than non-students). The discrepancy in
these two findings is due to the wording of questions asked during data collection.
The conclusions of Baum and Klaus are based on the National Crime
Victimization Survey, which gathers information on sexual assault by asking
category-centered questions, such as "[h]as anyone attacked or threatened you in
[this way]: rape, attempted rape or other type of sexual attack." Id. The
conclusions that Sampson cites are based on studies such as the National College
Women Sexual Victimization study, which use behavior-oriented questions, such
as "[h]as anyone made you have sexual intercourse by using force or threatening to
harm you or someone close to you?" See FISHER, ET AL, supra note 3, at 6, 13
(explicitly comparing the difference between the National Crime Victimization
Survey methodology and results and the National College Women Sexual
Victimization study methodology and results). Other than the wording of the
questions, the basic methodology of the two studies was identical, yet behavior-
oriented questions have been found to produce 11 times the number of reported
rapes. Id. at 11.
6. David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending
Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).
7. See id. at 76.
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report instances of abuse, there is a limited amount of information about the
extent of campus peer sexual violence against men. Despite the low rate of
male victim reporting, statistics do show that when men are raped, it is
usually done by other men.
These statistics show not only epidemic rates of violence, but because
they are drawn from studies conducted as early the mid-1980s 9 and as late
as 2007,10 they also show the persistence of this problem. Indeed, a
comprehensive journalistic account of campus peer sexual violence
published in 2009-10 by Kristen Lombardi of the Center for Public
Integrity (CPI)" shows that we are now moving into our fourth decade of
dealing with this problem.
While there are relatively few studies that give some insight into the
causes of both the problem and its persistence, a series of studies have used
the Routine Activities Theory to posit that sexual violence occurs so much
on college and university campuses because there are a surfeit of
"motivated offender[s] [and] suitable target[s] and an absence of capable
guardians all converg[ing] in one time and space."l 2 One notable study,
which the authors describe as using a feminist version of the Routine
Activities Theory, suggests that all three of these elements must be present
for there to be a significant crime problem and that the failure of schools to
act as "capable guardians" 3 elevates the influence of peer support on
8. See SAMPSON, supra note 5, at 3; BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 6.
9. See ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE (1988).
10. See KREBS ET AL., supra note 3; Benson et al., supra note 3.
11. See Sexual Assault on Campus, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/.
12. Amy I. Cass, Routine Activities and Sexual Assault: An Analysis of
Individual- and School-Level Factors, 22 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 350, 351 (2007).
The Routine Activities Theory originated with L. E. Cohen and M. Felson in
Social Changes and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach, 44 Am.
Soc. Rev. 588 (1979).
13. See Martin D. Schwartz et al., Male Peer Support and a Feminist Routine
Activities Theory: Understanding Sexual Assault on the College Campus, 18 JUST.
Q. 623, 630 (2001). See also Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard Tewksbury,
Sexual Assault of College Women: A Feminist Interpretation of a Routine
Activities Analysis, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 89, 101 (2002). Schwartz and his
colleagues provide an explanation for the history and use of the routine activities
theory in explanations of criminal violence generally and sexual violence on
college campuses specifically. The original theory apparently focused almost
entirely on the victims as "suitable targets" and has been criticized for seeking to
"deflect[] attention away from offenders' motivation." Schwartz et al., supra note
TK, at 625. Schwartz and various colleagues have therefore deliberately focused
on the "motivated offender" part of the equation, including by proposing a feminist
version of routine activities theory. Id. at 628. In addition, while they note that the
"absence of capable guardians" aspect of the theory's equation is the least studied,
[Vol. 38, No. 3
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"motivated offenders" (i.e. college and university men) to assault "suitable
targets" (i.e. college and university women). 
14
In light of this theory, other studies can be viewed as elucidating
different parts of the "suitable target," "motivated offender," and
"incapable guardian" triangle. For instance, studies have focused on the
"suitable targets" when studying the high rate of victim non-reporting and
on "the motivated offenders" when studying the widespread presence of
sexual harassment- and rape-supportive attitudes among college and
university students as serious contributing factors to the campus peer
sexual violence problem. Such studies estimate that ninety percent or more
of survivors of sexual assault on college and university campuses do not
report the assault, 5 due to fear of hostile treatment or disbelief by legal and
medical authorities, 6 not thinking a crime had been committed or that the
incidents were serious enough to involve law enforcement, 7 not wanting
family or others to know,' 8 lack of proof, 9 and the belief that no one will
believe them and that nothing will happen to the perpetrator.20 These fears
are not surprising when campuses regularly appear in the news for
incidents such as the infamous Yale fraternity pledge chant of "No means
yes! Yes means anal!,"'" and sociological studies have confirmed wide
they highlight the effect that a rape-supportive culture has on all three parts of the
equation, in that it "gives men some of the social support they need... to victimize
women [while women's] internalization of [the same culture] can contribute both
to the availability of 'suitable targets' and to the lack of deterrence structures to
act as effective guardianship." Id. at 630.
14. Id. at 646.
15. See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 24.
16. See id at 23. See also BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 13, 63;
WARSHAW, supra note 9, at 50.
17. See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 23.
18. See id. at 24.
19. See id.
20. See FISHER ET AL, supra note 3, at 23; BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3,
at 13, 63; WARSHAW, supra note 3, at 50.
21. See Michael Kimmel, The Men, And Women, of Yale, MS. MAGAZINE
BLOG, Oct. 17, 2010, http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/10/17/the-men-and-
women-of-yale/. Note that this incident was not an isolated one, but was merely a
repeat of an incident involving fraternity men, the campus Women's Center, and
the same chant in 2006. Id. A student member of the Women's Center said that
such incidents "tend to repeat themselves every year or two" at Yale. Jordi Gasso
& Sam Greenberg, DKE Apologizes for Pledge Chants, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct.
15, 2010), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/oct/15/dke-apologizes-for-
pledge-chants/. The October 2010 incident spurred a group of Yale students to file
a Title IX complaint against Yale. Yale is Subject of a Title IX Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/us/01
yale.html.
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subscription to such attitudes among college and university men well
beyond those at Yale.22 Many studies regarding the role of alcohol in
campus peer sexual violence focus on both the "suitable targets" and
"motivated offenders."2 3 Yet relatively few studies have focused on the
role of the "(in)capable guardians," i.e. the colleges and universities, and
how their institutional responses factor into the persistent campus peer
sexual violence problem.
Despite this lack of attention, however, institutional responses are a key
factor in the peer sexual violence epidemic. As the studies on this violence
cumulatively show, the rate of campus peer sexual violence and the high
non-reporting rate perpetuate a cycle whereby perpetrators commit sexual
violence because they think they will not get caught or because they
actually have not been caught. Then, because survivors do not report the
violence, perpetrators are not caught, continue to believe they will not get
caught, and continue to perpetrate. Moreover, because victim non-
reporting is closely linked to the documented disbelieving and/or hostile
reactions of others, particularly those in authority, the choice of
institutional response when victims do report has the potential either to
break the cycle of violence and non-reporting or to feed that cycle.
Therefore, responses likely to break the cycle need to be designed, on the
front end, to encourage victim reporting as well as other sources of
information about violence occurring at that institution, and, on the back
end, to hold perpetrators accountable, including through some kind of
effective disciplinary process.
For a variety of complicated reasons, at the current time and at many
colleges and universities, neither of these responses is generally occurring.
Instead, as the cases, journalistic accounts, and empirical studies reviewed
in this article suggest,2 4 on the front end, many institutions do their best to
avoid knowledge of the peer sexual violence, both in general and in
specific cases, and on the back end, they adopt disciplinary procedures that
22. For instance, a 2001 study found significant peer support for sexual
violence among college men. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 641. A study in
1993 found that five to eight percent of college men commit rape knowing it is
wrong; ten to fifteen percent of college men commit rape without knowing that it is
wrong; and thirty-five percent of college men indicated some likelihood that they
would rape if they could be assured of getting away with it. BOHMER & PARROT,
supra note 3, at 6-8, 21. Finally, a 1987 study indicated that thirty percent of men
in general say they would commit rape and fifty percent would "force a woman
into having sex" if they would not get caught. WARSHAW, supra note 9, at 97.
23. See, e.g., Benson et al., supra note 3.
24. These various sources also comport with the knowledge I have gained of
institutional responses to campus peer sexual violence in over 16 years of
experience working on these issues, first as a university administrator and then as
an attorney.
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make it more difficult to find students accused of sexual violence
responsible for that violence. In between these two points exist any
number of other, largely unhelpful and often harmful, institutional
responses.2 5 As a result, many institutions truly are incapable guardians
and provide the critical third leg in the "motivated offender"-"suitable
target"-"lack of capable guardian" tripod.
Yet evidence suggests that these unhelpful and harmful institutional
responses are motivated or encouraged not so much by direct anti-survivor
animus, but by other incentives, including "false" incentives born of
various myths about sexual violence. Chief among these myths is that
sexual violence is not just a crime, but a particular kind of crime: one
committed by strangers on victims who they do not know. In the public
imagination, a rapist is still a depraved criminal who jumps a woman in a
dark alley, late at night, someone who she has never seen before and may
never see again, depending on whether he is caught.26 Yet in reality-a
reality that has been confirmed repeatedly in the college and university
context-the vast majority of sexual violence perpetrators are those who
are known to the victims: acquaintances, dates, friends, husbands, family
members, religious advisors, employers, supervisors, and others,27 none of
whom need to jump a woman in a dark alley. Instead, they typically have
access to her home, her room, her workplace. They are around her when
she is most vulnerable and when the least amount of force, if any at all, is
needed to overcome her will and lack of consent.
Because of the myth of sexual violence as a stranger crime, the
responses adopted by many policymakers at institutions of higher education
suggest that these policymakers believe they should respond to such
violence in a manner similar to the criminal justice system both on the front
end and on the back end. Thus, on the front end, institutions' reporting
mechanisms generally direct students to report sexual violence to campus
police,28 who for the most part take a traditional law enforcement approach
25. A summary of such responses may be found in Cantalupo, Burying, supra
note 1, at 214-17.
26. SAMPSON, supra note 5, at 9.
27. See The Offenders, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT'L NETWORK,
http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-offenders.
28. An informal and non-exhaustive survey of schools whose sexual violence
reporting procedures are accessible via the web confirms that campus police and
other law enforcement authorities factor prominently in the reporting procedures
that most schools have adopted. Although these schools provide varying degrees
of detail regarding the procedures for reporting an assault, as well as varying
degrees of consistency regarding the process on different websites and publications
at the same school, many schools lead their list of reporting options with calling
local or campus police and/or strongly encourage students to contact police. See,
e.g., https://students.asu.edu/wellness/SVHelp (in advising students as to "what to
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to that report, often with all of the well-documented deficiencies of that
traditional approach in the sexual violence context.2 9 On the back end,
institutions create disciplinary procedures that adopt standards of proof,
evidentiary, and due process requirements provided to criminal
do" if "you've experienced sexual violence," listing contacting 911 first under the
first subheading of "find a safe place," addressing filing a police report under the
third subheading of "filing a police report is optional," and mentioning no other
reporting procedures, although the medical, counseling and student affairs
resources available are mentioned); http://handbook.fas.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?
keyword=k79903&pageid=icb.page418723 (stating in the Harvard College Student
Handbook that the policy of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences is that "any student
who believes that she or he has suffered a rape or indecent assault and battery is
strongly encouraged to report the incident to the H[arvard ]U[niversity ]P[olice
]D[epartment] immediately" and listing other offices under "Harvard Resources,"
but providing slightly different information in the Harvard University Faculty of
Arts and Sciences Handbook, available at http://webdocs.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/
ugrad handbook/2009_2010/chapter6/rapeindecent.html, although still listing the
HUPD as the first on a larger list of reporting options); http://www.temple.edu/
studentaffairs/heart/links/sexualassault.html (specifying that the first thing to do "if
you HAVE been sexually assaulted" is to "contact Campus Safety Services [the
campus police department]..."); http://tulane.edu/studentaffairs/violence/sexual
assault/sa-reporting-options.cfm (under "Sexual Assault Reporting Options,"
asking "Are you safe?" and advising victims to call the Tulane University Police
Department or the New Orleans Police Department at 911, then stating "Consider
calling a trusted friend, relative, a counselor, the Office of Violence Prevention &
Support Services, or a trained Sexual Aggression Peer Hotline & Education
(SAPHE) advocate"); http://www.registrar.ucla.edu/archive/catalog/2011-12/ucla
generalcatalogl l-12.pdf, p. 639 (advising that "Those who believe that they are the
victims of sexual assault should 1. Immediately call the police department.")
(emphasis in original); http://wwwold.uchicago.edu/sexualassault/whattodo.html
(urging victims to "Report the Incident. Call the University Police or Chicago
Police as soon as possible. If you are a student, contact the Sexual Assault Dean-
on-Call."); http://www.usm.maine.edu/ocs/policy-sexual-assault (indicating that
"students, employees, or visitors are strongly encouraged to make an official report
of any incident of sexual assault to the USM Police and/or Office of Community
Standards whether the incident occurred on or off campus"); http://
www.utexas.edu/student/studentaffairs/sexualassault.html (stating that
"Procedures to follow if a sex offense occurs: [are to] 1. Call 911
immediately to report the offense and seek medical attention without delay. 2.
Contact the University Police... and/or the Austin Police Department to report the
offense"); http://www.virginia.edu/sexualviolence/documents/sexual misconduct
policy070811.pdf (stating that students who "may be victims of sexual
misconduct" are "strongly urged to seek immediate assistance" from a number of
resources, "Police" being first on the list).
29 See generally Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda
for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 467, 468-
69, n. 3-13 (2005).
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defendants, 3 0 an approach that has been criticized for not keeping up with
rape law reforms initiated and adopted decades ago in the criminal justice
system of nearly all states, 3' as well as for its lack of fit with the purposes
30 Examples of schools that incorporate criminal justice system requirements
into their student discipline systems are most clearly seen in the recent focus on
standards of proof raised by the April Dear Colleague Letter's clarification that the
proper standard of proof for sexual violence cases is a preponderance of the
evidence standard. See infra note 91 and related text. Several sources confirm that
a substantial number of schools used a standard of proof higher than a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard prior to that date. For instance,
newspaper accounts after April 2011 discuss schools that were changing their
standards as a result of the Dear Colleague Letter. See, e.g., Daniel de Vise,
University of Virginia's Proposed Rules Aimed at Empowering Victims of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST, May 7, 2011, at Bl, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/education/univ-of-virginias-proposed-rules-would-lower
-standard-for-sexual-misconduct/2011/05/05/AFwQVtlF_story.html (showing
how the University of Virginia is implementing new policies to conform to the
new national guidelines, including a new standard of review for sexual assault
cases); Editorial, New Standard ofProofBetter, But Still Needs Work, STAN. REV.,
Apr. 18, 2011, available at http:// stanfordreview.org/article/editorial-new-standard
-of-proof-better-but-still-needs-work (discussing Stanford University's decision to
lower the standard of proof in cases involving sexual misconduct); Jon Ostrowsky,
New Federal Guidance on Univ Sexual Assault: Brandeis Follows Biden Lead on
Title Xl, THE BRANDEIS HOOT, Apr. 8, 2011, at 1, available at http://
thebrandeishoot.com/articles/10159 (highlighting Brandeis University's decision to
lower the standard of proof for internal hearings on sexual assault); Rebecca D.
Robbins, Harvard's Sexual Assault Policy Under Pressure, THE HARVARD
CRIMSON (May 11, 2012), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/5/l1/
harvard-sexual-assault-policy/ (discussing pressure being placed on Harvard to
change standard of proof to preponderance of evidence). Earlier studies have
indicated that the vast majority of schools do not articulate a standard of proof, but
of those that do, a substantial minority required a standard of proof higher than a
preponderance standard. See Anderson, 1000-01,Karjane, 120-21. See also Drake
University, CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT, available at: http://www.drake.
edu/dos/pdf/conductbrochure.pdf (specifying that accused students have a right to
"cross-examine the complainant," and that accused students will receive any
"exculpatory evidence" possessed by the University);
31 See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint
Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on
Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U.L. REV. 945, 949 (2004). See also Heather M.
Karjane et al., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: How AMERICA'S INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND 115 (2002), available at: http://www.rainn.org/pdf-
files-and-other-documents/Public-Policy/Legislative-Agenda/mso44.pdf (noting
that fewer than 1 in 10 of the schools surveyed responded that they had policies
comparable to "rape shield" laws).
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of student discipline and the institution's powers. .32 These responses are
not only not solving the problem, as already indicated, but they are also
contrary to both the spirit and letter of the applicable law-particularly
three areas of federal law: Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972
("Title IX), 33 the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act ("Clery Act"), 34 and case law regarding the
due process rights of students at state institutions when they stand accused
of any offense that could result in their suspension or expulsion.35
The remainder of this Article will look at these three areas of law to see
how these laws encourage institutions to adopt certain methods of dealing
with campus peer sexual violence. It will ultimately conclude that, both to
comply with their legal obligations and ultimately to end the violence,
institutions need to "decriminalize" their institutional responses to the
problem, both on the front end and on the back end. Finally, it will make
two recommendations of specific methods that institutions can use to begin
the decriminalization process.
I. LAWS APPLICABLE TO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
CAMPUS PEER SEXUAL VIOLENCE
The three legal regimes listed above constitute the three areas of
national law applicable to a higher education institution's responsibilities to
respond to incidents of campus peer sexual violence. Title IX and Clery
are federal statutes with accompanying administrative and court
enforcement structures that focus mainly on how an institution responds to
victims and reports of violence. The due process precedents are based on
U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution and focus on the institution's obligations to students
accused of perpetrating violence. It is important to note that, in any given
case, various state laws may also be applicable, but those laws are beyond
the scope of this article. This section will discuss each set of federal laws
in turn and demonstrate that, with regard to the back end of an institution's
responses, not only do none of these legal regimes require institutions to
imitate the criminal justice system in their disciplinary procedures but they
also often affirmatively require institutions to respond in a way that is
significantly different from a criminal approach. In addition, this section
will show that, on the front end, these laws are largely ineffective in
addressing the campus peer sexual violence problem because these laws-
32. See EDWARD N. STONER II, REVIEWING YOUR STUDENT DISCIPLINE
POLICY: A PROJECT WORTH THE INVESTMENT (2000), available at:
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED444074.pdf and discussion infra, notes 149-154.
33. 20U.S.C. § 1681 (2006 & Supp. V2011).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
35. See infra Part II.C.
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largely through silence-inadvertently encourage institutions to take a
criminal justice system-like approach to victim reporting and gathering
information about campus peer sexual violence.
A. Title IX
Title IX provides a good example of mixed legal incentives that
collectively show that imitating the criminal justice system on either the
front end or the back end of an institutions' response will be ultimately
ineffective in solving the campus peer sexual violence problem and may
actually perpetuate it. As the review below will show, Title IX's
requirements for institutions' responses to a report of sexual violence are
both quite protective of student survivors' rights and do not encourage
schools to take a "criminal" approach to their investigations and hearings
regarding such reports. However, because current enforcement of Title IX
does not account for the victim-non-reporting problem discussed above,
Title IX does not intervene in front end institutional responses related to
reporting, and allows--even provides incentives-for institutions to adopt
a criminal approach to reporting. This approach acts as an obstacle to
institutions preventing and ending peer sexual violence because, if the
studies discussed above are any judge, the criminal approach is a
significant deterrent to victim reporting.
Title IX prohibits sexual harassment in schools as a form of sex
discrimination.36 Peer sexual violence is generally considered a case of
hostile environment sexual harassment that is "so severe, pervasive and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an
educational opportunity or benefit." 37 Because of the severity of sexual
violence, even a single instance of violence will generally be considered
hostile environment sexual harassment.3 8
Title IX is enforced in two ways when peer sexual violence is at issue:
36. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENT BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES,
OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 2 (2001), available at:
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf [hereinafter REVISED
GUIDANCE].
37. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999).
38. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 6:
The more severe the conduct, the less the need to show a repetitive
series of incidents; this is particularly true if the harassment is physical.
For instance, if the conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to grab a
female student's breasts or attempts to grab any student's genital area
or buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a hostile environment.
Indeed, a single or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if
sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment.
Id.
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first, through a survivor's private right of action against her school 39 and
second, through administrative enforcement by the Office of Civil Rights
("OCR") of the Department of Education ("ED").40  Both enforcement
jurisdictions derive from the fact that schools agree to comply with Title IX
in order to receive federal funds.41
The private right of action requires a plaintiff/survivor to reach the
standard set out by two Supreme Court cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District42 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education.43 In order to make out a violation of Title IX, this standard
requires that a school act with "deliberate indifference" in the face of
"actual knowledge" of an incident of sexual violence.44 If a plaintiff can
meet that standard, the damages that the school could be required to pay are
quite significant. While most cases settle out of court, the settlements give
a sense of what both sides anticipate the damages awarded by a jury would
be. The largest settlement in a Title IX case to date was in Simpson v.
University of Colorado Boulder,45 when two college women were gang-
raped as a part of an unsupervised football recruiting program that the
university had evidence was leading to sexual violence. The university
ultimately paid $2.85 million to the plaintiffs, hired a special Title IX
analyst and fired some thirteen university officials, including the President
and football coach.46  Other large settlements include an $850,000
settlement by Arizona State University in a case where a student was raped
by a football player who had been expelled for misconduct, including
sexual harassment, but was readmitted after intervention by the coach.47 In
39. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett
Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
40. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at i.
41. Id. at 2-3.
42. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
43. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
44. See, e.g., S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008):
Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000);
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999).
45. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
46. See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Changing Social Norms? Title IX and Legal
Activism: Concluding Remarks, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407, 418 (2008).
47. Tessa Muggeridge, ASU Settlement Ends in $850,000 Payoff, STATE PRESS
(Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.statepress.com/archive/node/ 4 0 2 0 . ASU
has been sued again by a student who says she was raped by members of a
fraternity where the university knew there was a pattern of sexual violence and
where suspected mishandling of the investigation by campus police made criminal
charges impossible. Kyle Patton & Joseph Schmidt, Former Student Sues ABOR
Over Sexual Assault Case, STATE PRESS (July 18, 2010), available at
http://www.statepress.com/2010/07/18/former-student-sues-abor-over-sexual-assau
It-case/.
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addition, the University of Georgia paid a six-figure settlement to a
plaintiff who was raped by several athletes, including one who the
university knew had a criminal record before he was admitted to the
48
university.
Beyond these high-profile cases, there have been many cases where
courts have allowed cases to proceed to a jury for a determination as to
whether the school violated Title IX. Schools have been found to have
acted with deliberate indifference for the following general categories of
institutional responses to a report of sexual violence:
1) The school does nothing at all;
4 9
2) The school talks to the alleged perpetrator, who denies the
allegations, makes no determination as to which story is more
credible,50 and then does nothing, including nothing to protect
48. See Rosenfeld, supra note 42, at 420.
49. See, e.g., Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21968 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 21, 2012); Estate of Carmichael v. Galbraith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 857
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d
135 (N.D.N.Y 2011) (for a more complete fact statement, see
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/pratt-v-indian-river-central-school-distr
ict); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified School Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125175
(E.D.Cal. Oct 28, 2011); Rinsky v. Boston Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136876
(D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010); T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263
(E.D.N.Y. 2009); McGrath v. Dominican College, 672 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 25, 2009); Doe ex rel Doe v. Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.
Conn. 2009); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D. Kan. 2008);
Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 365 (W.D. Pa.
2008); S.G. v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *15-16
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82199, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008); Bruning v. Carroll Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 892, 915-16 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Doe v. Southeastern Greene
Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2006); Bashus v.
Plattsmouth Cmty. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, at *10 (D. Neb. Aug.
3, 2006); Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (D. Conn.
2006); Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63-65 (D. Conn. 2006),
aff'd, 200 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2006); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Schools,
419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (D. Kan. 2005); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 809 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ.,
296 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067
(D. Nev. 2001); 0. H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21725 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp.
2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
50. See, e.g., Alexander, 177 P.3d at 740.
493
494 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
the victim from any retaliation from the alleged perpetrator or
other students as a result of her report;5 1
3) The school waits or investigates so slowly that it takes months
or years for the survivor to get any redress;5 2
51. See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at
*33 (6th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Galster, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77706 (E.D. Wis. Jul
14, 2011); Terrell v. Del. State Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841 (D. Del. July
23, 2010); Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 226; Liberal Sch. Dist., 562
F. Supp. 2d at 1324; Jones v. Kern High Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74040
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008); Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823
(C.D. Ill. 2008); Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at
*17 (D. Conn. May 19, 2008); M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51933, at *28 (D.Conn. 2008); James, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at
*6; S.G., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522 at *10, *14-15; Bashus, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56565, at *10-11; Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45; Doe v.
Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *39 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006); E.
Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60; Martin, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 974;
Jones, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11. In addition
to these cases, in two cases where the school was granted summary judgment on
the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim, the courts allowed the plaintiffs claim
alleging that the school itself retaliated to proceed to a jury: Pemberton v. West
Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17138 (M.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012)
(finding that the school did not act with deliberate indifference but denying the
school's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs retaliation claim when the
school initiated an investigation into her residency and dropped her from the
school when she complained after three male students attacked and groped her
after school); Marcum ex rel. C.V. v. Board of Educ. of Bloom-Carroll Local
School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 2d 657 (S. D. Ohio 2010) (denying deliberate
indifference claim but granting retaliation claim of 12 year-old girl who was
sexually assaulted on the school bus by a 17 year-old boy, suspended along with
the boy for 10 days, complained about students harassing her by calling her a
"slut" and "whore" for four days after her return to school, and was then suspended
and expelled for the alleged theft of a wallet and iPod). Finally, one case is a
further outlier on this issue: Doe v. Univ. of the Pacific, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
1844 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding in an unpublished opinion that the district court
"did not err" in its decision rejecting plaintiffs claims that the school had not
adequately investigated suspicions that one of the men who raped plaintiff was
involved in the gang-rape of another woman the month prior to plaintiff's rape, had
acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs rape "by requiring her to be in
contact with her assailants when it refused to expel two of the men" and had
retaliated against plaintiff for her Title IX complaint).
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir.
2007) (finding the school took eight months to respond to reports of a gang rape);
Evans v. Bd. of Educ, Southwestern Sch. Dist.,, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72926 (S.
D. Ohio 2010) (denying school's motion for summary judgment on Title IX claims
when school did not respond to two 12 year-old girls' reports of sexual harassment
by male students on school bus [including escalating incidents of verbal
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4) School officials investigate in a biased way, such as through
their treatment of the survivor or characterization of her 
case;53
5) The school determines or acknowledges that the sexual
violence did occur, but does not discipline the assailant or
other students engaging in retaliatory harassment, minimally
disciplines the assailant or other students engaging in
retaliatory harassment, or also disciplines the victim of the
violence;
54
harassment, pulling down the girls' pants, exposing their breasts and forcing one to
perform oral sex] and eventually suspended both the victim and the perpetrator of
the forced oral sex incident, even when the perpetrator pled guilty to attempted
assault in a separate criminal proceeding); Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d
at 22 (denying summary judgment to school when a male student sexually
assaulted a female student off school grounds and the school took no disciplinary
action against the assailant [permitting him "to continue attending school with
[plaintiff] for three years after the assault, leaving constant potential for
interactions between the two"], engaged in unreasonable delay by allowing the two
students to share a lunch period and class for over six months after the school was
notified of the assault, and allowed the assailant's "friends [to] verbally harass[ and
threaten] her in school, calling her 'slut,' 'cow,' 'whore,' 'liar,' and 'bitch,"' and to
send her a text message stating "'You better watch your back if my boy goes to
jail...')
53. See, e.g., Galster, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77706; Albiez v. Kaminski,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59373 (E.D. Wisc. June 14, 2010); Terrell, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74841; Babler v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case 2:10-cv-01459-RRB (D.
Ariz. Feb. 15, 2010); Marcum, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 657; McGrath, 672 F. Supp. 2d
at 477; Greater Johnstown Sch. District, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 365; Patterson, 2009
U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at *4; Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 823; S.S.,
177 P.3d at 740; Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942,
954 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Erskine CoIl., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780 at *33-34;
Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11; Kelly v. Yale Univ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4543, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003); Snelling v. Fall Mt. Regional Sch. Dist.,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3591 (D.N.H. 2001).
54. See, e.g., Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21968; Galster, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77706; Pratt, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 135; Evans, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72926; Terrell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841; Marcum, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 657;
Coventry Bd of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 226; City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d
at 263; Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1324; Kern High Sch. Dist., 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74040; Annamaria M v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38641 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2006); Southeastern Greene Sch.
Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790; Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d at
809; Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 869; Henkle, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Snelling,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3591 (D.N.H. 2001); Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000); Vance, 231 F.3d at 262 (6th
Cir. 2000); S.S., 177 P.3d at 739 2008; Hamden, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at
*5; Stamford, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, at *28; Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at
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6) School officials investigate and determine that the sexual
violence did occur and proceed to remove the victim from
classes, housing, or transportation services where she would
encounter her assailant, resulting in significant disruption to
the victim's education but none to the assailant's;5
7) School officials take some action to address the sexual
violence, but when that action is ineffective, do not change the
response to address its ineffectiveness or do anything more to
address the violence;56
8) School officials tell the victim not to tell anyone else,
including parents and the police;5 7
9) The school requires or pressures the survivor to confront her
assailant or to go through mediation with him before allowing
her to file a complaint for investigation.
954; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-1; Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35780, at *35; Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447; Doe v. Oyster River
Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467,481 (D.N.H. 1997).
55. See, e.g., Terrell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841 (D. Del. July 23, 2010)
(denying the school's motion to dismiss because, when plaintiff reported that
another student assaulted and beat her, the school permitted him to continue
attending classes without restriction, "informed [plaintiff] that she would be
required to adjust her schedule and transfer out of [a shared] class," and "punished
[her] equally with her male assailant," by initiating disciplinary proceedings
against her); Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (finding that after victim repeatedly
harassed and assaulted the only action the school took was to move the victim to a
different classroom); James, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at *6 (W.D. Okla.
2008) (same). But see Pemberton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17138 (M.D. La. Feb.
10, 2012) (finding that the school did not act with deliberate indifference after
plaintiff was sexually assaulted by three male students who attacked and groped
her after school, the school suspended the boys, the plaintiff was subjected to
verbal harassment by the assailants and their friends, and the school only offered to
switch her out of the class if she wanted to avoid her harassers).
56. See S.S., 177 P.3d at 739; Vance, 231 F.3d at 261; Jones, 397 F. Supp. 2d
at 645; Martin, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 974; Patterson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at
*32; Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38641.
57. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that after a male student repeatedly raped a student with spastic cerebral
palsy, the school did not inform and told the victim not to inform her mother);
Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. at 479 (finding that two girls were
harassed repeatedly by a boy who exposed himself to them and touched them on
their legs and breasts on the school bus and in school; when they reported the
behavior, the school's guidance counselor told them not to tell their parents
because it could subject the school to lawsuits).
58. See, e.g., Alexander, 177 P.3d at 740.
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In addition, the case law in this area increasingly gives a sense of what
school responses are adequate under Title IX, since two clear trends
emerge from cases where courts have granted schools' motions for
summary judgment or to dismiss the plaintiffs' Title IX claims. First, once
a school has knowledge of an incidence of sexual violence, the case law
suggests that separating the students involved can help a school avoid a
"deliberate indifference" finding.
59 Moreover, in the majority of these
cases, the separation of the students was achieved by moving the alleged
perpetrator,o suspending the alleged perpetrator,
61 or both. Second, a
59. See, e.g., Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12444 (1st Cir. Mass. 2007); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights,
Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. Ill. 2003); Watkins v. La Marque Indep.
Sch. Dist., 308 Fed. Appx. 781, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1500 (5th Cir. Tex. 2009);
P.K. v. Caesar Rodney High Sch., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572 (D. Del. Jan. 27,
2012); Brooks v. City of Philadelphia, 747 F. Supp. 2d 477 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010);
Marshall v. Batesville Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99663 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9,
2008); Addison v. Clarke County Bd. of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56166
(M.D. Ga. July 30, 2007); Lewis v. Booneville Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24976 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 2, 2007); Theriault v. Univ. of S. Me., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17364 (D. Me. 2004); Doe v. Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 41-4,
329 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D.S.D. 2003); Ings-Ray v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7683 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2003); C.R.K. v. U.S.D. 260, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6326 (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 2002); Clark v. Bibb County Bd. of Educ., 174 F.
Supp. 2d 1369, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20561 (M.D. Ga. 2001); KF's Father v.
Marriott, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2534 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2001); Wilson v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist. & Thom Amons, 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex.
2001); Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Vaird v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492 (E.D.
Pa. May 12, 2000). Only three cases differ in some respects from the clear weight
of this authority regarding separating students involved in sexual violence. See
Univ. of the Pacific, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1844; Pemberton, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17138 (M.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012); O'Hara v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12153 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2002) (dismissing Ps claims when she was
sexually assaulted repeatedly through sexual touching of breasts and genitalia by a
male classmate, only reporting the assaults when the assailant became violent, after
which the school suspended the assailant for 70 days, and then allowed him to
return to school, when he "could occasionally be found in the same vicinity as the
plaintiff and ... would stare at her");
60. Of the seventeen cases listed in footnote 55, above, thirteen schools
separated the students by moving the alleged perpetrator or separating the students
in an unspecified or equal manner. See Porto, 488 F.3d at 67; Gabrielle M, 315
F.3d at 817; Watkins, 308 Fed. Appx. at 781; Addison, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
56166; Lewis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 24976; Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1;
Lennox Sch. Dist., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1063; Ings-Ray, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
7683; C.R.K., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 6326; Clark, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1369;
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smaller group of schools have avoided being found deliberately indifferent
because they expelled the perpetrators after determining them to be
responsible for peer sexual violence.62
These cases show that schools can face significant liability if they
respond to a report of sexual violence in a way that is not protective of
student survivors. This is a significant difference from the criminal justice
system, which is not particularly protective of victims, where victims are
not considered parties on par with the state and the defendant, and whose
interests are therefore not at the center of a criminal proceeding. Moreover,
the focus of this case law is forward-looking, scrutinizing whether the
school's institutional responses avoided or led to further risk of or actual
occurrence of harassment or violence against a survivor. Such responses
often require actions generally not associated with the criminal justice
system, such as moving an accused student out of housing or classes prior
to an investigation or determination as to the "truth" of the victim's report.
However, these cases obscure the number of cases where the victim was
not able to successfully show that the school had "actual knowledge" of the
violence, due to three problems with the "actual knowledge" standard and
how it has been applied by the courts as a whole. First, the actual
knowledge prong requires that the school have actual knowledge of the
harassment, raising the question of who represents the school. There is
significant variation on this question. In some cases, especially ones where
the harasser is a teacher or school official, if only another teacher or school
official of equal rank has knowledge of the harassment, courts have found
this knowledge to be insufficient to qualify as knowledge by the school.
63
Courts are more open to allowing teachers to count as the school in peer
sexual harassment cases, 64 but this is not guaranteed,65 and others who
Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 690; Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 447; Vaird, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at 6492.
61. See Caesar Rodney High Sch., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572; Marshall,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99663; Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1; Lennox Sch. Dist.,
329 F. Supp. 2d at 1063; Clark, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1369; Vaird, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at 6492.
62. See Doe v. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93551
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2011); Snethen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for the City of Savannah,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2008); Fortune v. City of Detroit
Pub. Schs., 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2660 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
63. Megan Ryan ed., Commentary, Comments from the Spring 2007 Harvard
Journal of Law & Gender Conference Held at Harvard Law School, 31 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 378, 387 (2008) (quoting Linda Wharton).
64. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1099 (D. Minn. 2000); Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908
(D. Minn. 1999); Soriano ex rel. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., No. 01 CV
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would seem to be in similar positions of authority as teachers, such as bus
drivers,6 6 coaches, 6 and other school professionals or "paraprofessionals" 68
have been judged to be "inappropriate persons." This leads to confusing
variation,6 9 requiring survivors to know and parse through school
hierarchies in specific and diverse contexts based on the identities of the
perpetrators and the relationships between the person with knowledge and
the harasser.
Second, variation has emerged as to what kind of knowledge constitutes
actual knowledge. If a school is aware of a student's harassment of other
students besides the victim who is reporting in a given case, must the
school have actual knowledge of the harassment experienced by that
491(JG), 2004 WL 2397610, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2004); Ind Area Sch. Dist.,
397 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
65. See M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-vc-0177, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51933, at *25-26 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008) (holding that actual knowledge
did not exist until assistant principal was informed, even though other school
officials were previously aware of the incident), vacated in part by Stamford, ,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933; Snethen, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (granting
summary judgment when the school did not act with deliberate indifference to an
attempted rape of one student by another and a teacher who did not necessarily
qualify as an "appropriate person" for actual knowledge purposes had previously
observed "horseplay" with sexual connotations between the assailant and another
girl); Peer ex rel. Jane Doe v. Porterfield, No. 1:05-cv-769, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1380, at *28-30 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (stating notice must be to an "official . .
. capable of terminating or suspending the individual" as held to apply to a
principal but not necessarily teachers (quoting Nelson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 356,
No. 00-2079, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3093, at *15 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2002))).
66. See, e.g., Staehling v. Metro. Gov't, No. 3:07-0797, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91519, at *30-31 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2008).
67. See, e.g., Halvorson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, No. CIV-07-1363-M,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96445, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2008) (explaining that
the coaches "did not have authority to institute measures on the District's behalf').
But see Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1033-34 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that "case law does not expressly limit the
employee who may trigger a school district's liability under Title IX; it is an 'open
question.' . . . [D]eciding who exercises substantial control for the purposes of
Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based inquiry. . . . On the present record and
without evidence from the District, it cannot be established as a matter of law that
Coach Scudder was not an 'appropriate person' for purposes of Title IX.").
68. See, e.g., Noble v. Branch Intermediate Sch. Dist., No. 4:01cv 58, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600, at *44-48 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2002); Doe v. North
Allegheny Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93551 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2011)
(indicating that a Student Service Coordinator and social work intern were not
"appropriate persons" for actual knowledge purposes).
69. Ryan, supra note 63, at 388.
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particular victim? Courts have resolved the issue in different ways.7 ° In a
review of the peer harassment cases where this question was posed, the
decisions are fairly evenly split between courts that find that the school
must have actual knowledge of the harassment experienced by the
particular survivor bringing the case, those that state that the school's
knowledge of the peer harasser's previous harassment of other victims is
sufficient to meet the actual knowledge standard, and ambiguous
decisions.7'
70. Id. at 388-89.
71. Of eighteen cases where this question was dealt with directly or indirectly,
six resulted in the court not requiring actual knowledge of harassment involving a
specific victim. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1289 (1 1th Cir.
2007) (implying that knowledge of the perpetrator's previous harassment was
enough to put the school on notice); Callahan, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-34 (noting
the harassing behavior does not have to be plaintiff specific); Lopez v. Metro.
Gov't, 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 915-16 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (concluding that
knowledge of the perpetrator's sexual proclivities and previous misbehavior put
the school on notice even though no prior incidents had occurred between the
perpetrator and victim); Staehling, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, at *28-31 ("The
institution must have possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could
reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of
harassment upon which plaintiff's legal claim is based."); J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, No. CV 06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83855, at *45-46
(D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008) ("Title IX claims can be based on recipients knowledge
of, and deliberate indifference to, a particular harasser's conduct in general.");
Michelle M. v. Dunsmuir Joint Union Sch. Dist., No. 2:04-cv-241 1-MCE-PAN,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77328, at *16, *20 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2006) (finding that
although the defendants may not have had actual knowledge of specific incidents
of peer sexual harassment, the defendant's knowledge of the perpetrator's prior
disturbing behavior, coupled with the defendant's failure to disseminate its policies
on sexual harassment, could give rise to Title IX liability).
Eight cases resulted in the court finding that the actual knowledge prong had
not been met because the school did not have knowledge of harassment directed at
the victim bringing the case. See North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93551 (granting school's motion for summary judgment when a male
student raped a female student with whom he had had previous consensual sexual
encounters, when the school was aware of the alleged perpetrator's previous sexual
assaults but did not expel him from the school district, only expelled him after his
rape of plaintiff); Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. Mich.
2012) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment when a school
revised the Individual Educational Plan of a special education student with known
disciplinary problems inside and outside of school, to allow for a period of adult
supervision after he shoved his girlfriend (plaintiff) into a locker, demanded she
perform oral sex on him and made obscene gestures toward her at a school
basketball game, only expelling him after he raped plaintiff approximately 8 weeks
later). Porterfield, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1380, at *28-30 (noting that knowledge
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of student's disciplinary problems did not amount to knowledge that he posed a
sexual threat to other students); Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2007):
While the precise boundaries of what kind of 'actual knowledge' a
school must have to subject itself to Title IX liability remain undefined,
it is generally accepted that the knowledge must encompass either
actual notice of the precise instance of abuse that gave rise to the case
at hand or actual knowledge of at least a significant risk of sexual
abuse.
Id. See also Fortune v. City of Detroit Pub. Schs., 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS
2660 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004) (affirming summary judgment for school
when two boys raped plaintiff in an empty classroom after an after-school activity
and previous complaints about sexual harassment from another girl regarding one
of the boys did not count as actual knowledge prior to plaintiff's rape because that
complaint had not indicated that the boy harassed other girls); Soriano ex rel.
Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 2004 WL 2397610, at *4 (finding that while a
general lack of discipline in the school and a student's reputation for inappropriate
sexual conduct were not enough to put the school on actual notice, the plaintiffs
complaint to a teacher did put the school on actual notice); Noble, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19600, at *39-47 (holding that knowledge of the perpetrator's past
disciplinary problems was not enough to put the school on actual notice); K.F. v.
River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. 01 C 50005, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12468, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2002) (noting that perpetrator's history of general
disciplinary problems was not enough to put the school on actual notice).
Another twelve cases were ambiguous on this point or were decided on factual
as opposed to legal considerations. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500
F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007):
Gebser rejected a negligence standard for liability-namely, a standard
that would have imposed liability on a school district for 'failure to
react to teacher-student harassment of which it . . . should have
known'-but instead had 'concluded that the district could be liable for
damages only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear
violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of
teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge.
Id. See also Winzer v. Sch. Dist. for City of Pontiac, 105 F. App'x. 679, 681
(6th Cir. 2004) ("The Supreme Court did not decide in Davis whether the 'known
acts of student-on-student sexual harassment' must have been directed against the
plaintiff herself. Neither did it decide whether such acts must have been
committed by the plaintiffs harasser, as opposed to some other student.");
Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. Mo. 2003) (no actual knowledge of
the school prior to plaintiffs rape, because "sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by
DTD fraternity members, other than Duggan, at locations other than the 507
premises, fails to satisfy the "known acts" requirement outlined in Davis"); Murrell
v. Denver Pub. Sch., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he first two prongs
of the Davis analysis require that a school official who possessed the requisite
control over the situation had actual knowledge of, and was deliberately indifferent
to, the alleged harassment."); Schaefer v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp.
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Finally, the actual knowledge standard, as Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in Gebser, encourages schools to avoid knowledge rather than set
2d 1052 (D.N.M. 2010) (dismissing Title IX claim for no actual knowledge where
plaintiff was hit in the testicles once sufficiently hard to cause injuries by an
unknown student who plaintiff claimed was a part of a gang of boys who had
"racked" other boys in incidents about which the school was aware); Morgan v.
Bend-La Pine Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9443 (D. Or. Feb. 6, 2009)
(granting summary judgment to school when plaintiff with a disability was
involved in coercive "sexually charged incidents" but the school did not have
actual knowledge because of plaintiffs and other students' concealment);
Renguette v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. ex rel. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 540 F. Supp.
2d 1036, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30225 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (finding lack of actual
knowledge because sexual activity between two students may have been
voluntary/consensual); Richard P. v. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75068
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2006) (denying motion for a new trial when jury found lack of
actual knowledge in case involving the sexual assault by two female students by
several male students in a Laundromat); Doe v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Regents,
No. 2:04-CV-0307, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70444, at *31-34 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28,
2006):
The Supreme Court has declined to apply a constructive-knowledge
standard, demanding actual knowledge of sexual harassment in Title IX
cases of teacher-on-student harassment . . . . The Supreme Court has
unequivocally imported the actual-knowledge standard into cases of
student-on-student harassment. . . . The Sixth Circuit has followed the
Supreme Court's lead in requiring actual knowledge of student-on-
student sexual harassment in Title IX cases.
Id. See also Doe v. Town of Bourne, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10021 (D. Mass.
May 28, 2004) (no actual knowledge of the sexual and physical assault when the
victim complained that boys who had sexually and physically assaulted her were
pushing her into lockers and the school did not respond to her complaint); Crandell
v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2836 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (some of plaintiff's claims regarding one instance of
sexual harassment allowed to go forward while many others barred by lack of
actual knowledge due to the victim's failure to report them); Vaird, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6492, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000) ("[A]ctual notice requires more
than a simple report of inappropriate conduct by a teacher.").
The number of district courts that insist upon actual knowledge of harassment
of a specific victim is doubly surprising because it suggests a certain acceptance of
victim-blaming attitudes by some courts. A belief that the identity of the victim of
harassing behavior is relevant to whether the school is obligated to respond to the
harassment focuses the school or court on the victim's and not the perpetrator's
behavior, suggesting that some victims must do something that invites the
harassment, whereas other victims are "blameless." Indeed, if a perpetrator is
known to have harassed or assaulted multiple victims, this should suggest that the
victim's identity and behavior are not relevant, because the perpetrator himself
does not find the identity of the victim relevant.
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up procedures by which survivors can easily report. 72 This is in contrast to
the constructive knowledge standard, which asks whether the defendant
knew, or reasonably should have known, that a risk of harassment
existed.73 Such a standard creates incentives for schools to set up
mechanisms likely to flush out and address harassment, since there is a
substantial risk that a court will decide that the school "should have
known" about the harassment anyway. In addition, the rule adopted by the
Supreme Court in the sexual harassment in employment cases, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton74 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,75 caused
many employers to adopt sexual harassment policies and procedures.
76
Employers did so because under the Faragher/Ellerth standard, if they
have such policies and procedures in place, but a plaintiff fails to use them,
the employer has a defense against liability for the harassment.
77
A decade plus of experience with the actual knowledge standard
demonstrates that these are not the incentives created by the actual
knowledge standard. In fact, as already noted, doing nothing at all is both
most schools' response of choice and the response that is most likely to
qualify as a violation of a different prong of the same review standard.
Unlike with the behavior encouraged by Faragher/Ellerth in the
employment context, there has not been a rush to develop policies,
procedures, and training on sexual harassment among schools as there has
been among employers. In addition, we are now left with the unjust result
that children and young people with fewer resources to deal with sexual
harassment and violence are less protected at their schools-where their
attendance for at least the early years is compulsory-than their adult
parents are at their non-compulsory workplaces.
Thus, the actual knowledge standard does not encourage schools to
address the victim-non-reporting problem and, if anything, gives schools
72. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 296 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
73. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting); REVISED GUIDANCE,
supra note 32, at 13.
74. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
75. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1998).
76. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph
of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4
(2003) ("The centerpiece of the [FaragherEllerth] liability scheme is a rule of
automatic liability for hostile environment harassment by supervisors, softened by
an affirmative defense that excuses employers from liability or damages if they
take adequate preventative and corrective measures. . . . Employers have taken
their [lawyers'] advice, by and large, adopting or updating procedures and training
programs and implementing internal grievance procedures.").
77. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
504 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
incentives to suppress reporting, at least passively. Such passive
suppression is easily done just by making no changes to the traditional
criminal justice, policing approach to reports of sexual violence. As
indicated by the statistics that began this article, fear of hostile treatment by
police and other authority figures is the most common reason listed by
student victims for not reporting.
Fortunately, OCR uses a constructive knowledge standard when it
investigates schools for violations of Title IX in peer sexual harassment
cases, in part because the OCR process is more injunctive than
compensatory, so student victims complaining to OCR will not get
monetary damages. OCR enforcement generally takes place as a result of a
complaint being filed regarding a school's response to a sexual harassment
case, which causes OCR to undertake a fairly comprehensive investigation
78of that school's response system. This investigation often includes a
close review of institutional policies and procedures, as well as the steps
the school took to resolve a complaint79 and files relating to past sexual
harassment cases that required a school to respond in some way.so OCR
also interviews those involved in the case, particularly relevant school
personnel."' OCR cases are generally resolved through a "letter of finding"
("LOF") addressed to the school and written by OCR, which is sometimes
accompanied by a "commitment to resolve" signed by the school.82
As a result, OCR's approach is both more comprehensive and more
exacting than is possible in a private lawsuit, especially under the
Gebser/Davis standard. Schools can be, and often are, required to change
their entire response system to peer sexual violence and harassment,
including but not limited to policies, procedures, and resource allocations.
Thus, in addition to the list of institutional responses that have gotten
schools in trouble in private lawsuits, each category of which includes
investigations where schools have been found in violation of Title IX ,
78. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 14.
79. See id.
80. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., How the Office of Civil Rights Handles
Complaints, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html.
81. See id.
82. See EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 1322
(Travis Hicks, ed. 2008).
83. Examples where the victim reported the rape to a school official or some
other authority figure, but the school did nothing or failed to prevent the offender
or his friends from continually coming in contact with the victim, include: Letter
from Debbie Osgood, Director, Chicago, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to Dennis Carlson, Superintendent, Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. (Mar. 15,
2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/05115901.
html; Letter from Zachary Pelchat, Supervisory Attorney, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., and Anurima Bhargava, Chief, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
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OCR has additionally found Title IX violations when a school's policies
and procedures did not follow OCR's requirements, such as when schools
create fact-finding procedures and hearings with significantly more
procedural rights for the accused than the survivor;8 4 adopt a standard of
Dep't of Just. to Richard L. Swanson, Superintendent, Tehachapi Unified School
District (June 29, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/inves
tigations/0911103 l.html; Letter from Catherine D. Criswell, Director, Cleveland,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Dave L. Armstrong, Esq., Vice
President for Enrollment and Legal Counsel, Notre Dame College (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/15096001.
html [hereinafter Notre Dame C. Letter]; Letter from Charlene F. Furr, Operations
Officer, Dall., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Jimmy D.
Hattabaugh, Superintendent, Mansfield Sch. Dist. (Apr. 16, 2007) (on file with
author); Letter from Cathy H. Lewis, Acting Dir., Policy & Enforcement Serv.,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Thomas Crawford, Superintendent,
Acad. Sch. Dist. (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with author).
For examples where the school delayed responding, see, e.g., Letter from
Frankie Furr, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to James
E. Nelson, Superintendent, Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. (Aug. 5, 2005) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. Letter]; Letter from Thomas
J. Hibino, Reg'l Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to
Daniel Kehoe, Superintendent, Millis Pub. Sch. (May 19, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Millis Pub. Sch. Letter]; Letter from Charles R. Love, Program
Manager, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Glenn Roquemore,
President, Irvine Valley College (Jan. 28, 2003) (on file with author). For more
details on cases in which the school conducted a biased investigation, see
Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. Letter; Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'l Civil
Rights Dir., S.F., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Ruben Armifiana,
President, Sonoma State Univ. (Apr. 29, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Sonoma State Univ. Letter]; Letter from John E. Palomino to Karl Pister (June 15,
1994), in University of California, Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2141 (on file
with author) [hereinafter University of California, Santa Cruz Letter].
For examples of cases where school officials investigate and determine that the
sexual violence did occur, but did not discipline or minimally disciplined the
assailant and did not protect the survivor from any retaliation, see Millis Pub. Sch.
Letter; Sonoma State Univ. Letter; Letter from Patricia Shelton, Branch Chief, and
C. Mack Hall, Div. Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to James C.
Enochs, Superintendent, Modesto City Schools (Dec. 10, 1993) (on file with
author); Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'l Civil Rights Dir., S.F., Office for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Robin Wilson, President, Cal. State Univ.,
Chico (Oct. 23, 1991) (on file with author).
84. See, e.g., Letter from Debbie Osgood, Director, Chicago, Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to The Reverend John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., President,
University of Notre Dame (June 30, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/investigations/0507201 I.html [hereinafter U. Notre Dame Letter];
Letter from Catherine D. Criswell, Director, Cleveland, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Gloria Hage, Esq., General Counsel, Eastern Michigan
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proof more exacting than "preponderance of the evidence,",8 have policies
or procedures that are contradictory, confusing and/or not coordinated,86 do
not provide clear time frames for prompt resolutions of complaints, or
violate more "technical" Title IX requirements. Thus, even more so than
the "deliberate indifference" cases noted above, the responses required by
OCR are decriminalized, with explicit rejection of the criminal "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof and an elevation of the student
survivor's rights in hearings and other procedures above the status of
victims in the criminal system.
Despite this good news, OCR's enforcement, like enforcement of Title
IX in the court context, has significant problems that encourage schools to
avoid, passively or actively, knowledge of campus peer sexual violence
generally and of specific cases particularly. First, very few students seem
University (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
investigations/15096002.html [hereinafter E.M.U. Letter]; Notre Dame C. Letter,
supra note TK; Letter from Myra Coleman, Team Leader, Philadelphia, Office for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Valerie I. Harrison, Esq., University Counsel,
Temple University (June 4, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Temple U.
Letter]; Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Reg'1 Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Jane Jervis, President, The Evergreen State Coll.
(Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Evergreen State Coll. Letter].
85. See, e.g., U. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 80 (noting that although the
university stated that it used a preponderance of the evidence standard, it did not
notify students of this standard, and requiring this notification); Evergreen State
Coll. Letter, supra note 80 (stating that the evidentiary standard applied to Title IX
actions was that of a "preponderance of evidence"); Letter from Sheralyn
Goldbecker, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to John J.
DeGioia, President, Georgetown Univ. (May 5, 2004) (on file with author)
(requiring a preponderance of evidence standard upon investigation); Sonoma State
Univ. Letter, supra note 79 (noting that a "much different and lower standard [of
proof] is required for proving a case of sexual harassment, including assault, under
Title IX" than for "a criminal charge alleging sexual assault").
86. See, e.g., U. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 80; E.M.U. Letter, supra note
80; Temple U. Letter, supra note 80; Letter from Sandra W. Stephens, Team
Leader, Dall., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to David Schmidly,
President, Oklahoma State Univ. (June 10, 2004) (on file with author); Letter from
Howard Kallem, Chief Attorney, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to
Stephen W. Vescovo, Esq., Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell
(March 26, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Christian Brothers Univ.
Letter]; Sonoma State Univ. Letter, supra note 79.
87. See, e.g., U. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 80; E.M.U. Letter, supra note
80; Temple U. Letter, supra note 80; Christian Brothers Univ. Letter, supra note
82; University of California, Santa Cruz Letter, supra note 79; Sonoma State Univ.
Letter, supra note 79.
88. See, e.g., Letter from Linda Howard-Kurent to Norman Cohen, Utah
College of Massage Therapy (Aug. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
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to be aware of OCR's complaint process. A single page of information is
posted on the OCR website,89 but this is the only place that it seems to
appear. Even OCR's own guidance and an April 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter regarding sexual violence never explain how one would go about
initiating an investigation or where one might file a complaint,90 even while
referring to OCR investigations.91 In addition, at no place on the OCR
websites dealing with the complaint process is sexual harassment
mentioned, so these pages are not terribly easy to find through simple
internet searching. The CPI's series on campus sexual violence confirms
that "few students know they have the right to complain" and "the number
of investigations into sexual assault-related cases is 'shockingly low."' 9 2
The lack of knowledge regarding the complaint process and the consequent
low rate of complaints undercuts the effectiveness of OCR's enforcement
regime, including its constructive knowledge requirements.
Second and more critically, lack of publicity regarding OCR's
resolution of the complaints that it does receive diminishes the reach of
those resolutions because schools that have not been investigated cannot
learn from previous investigations and proactively fix any problems with
their own response systems. The only way that anyone other than a
complainant or the school being investigated can see the resolution of most
cases is through filing a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request.93
If schools or individuals wish to see various OCR LOFs but do not know
89. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 76 (describing the criteria used by
OCR to evaluate a complaint and the procedures for challenging determinations of
non-compliance); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., How to File a Discrimination Complaint
with the Office for Civil Rights, ED.Gov, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/howto.html?src=rt (describing the process to file a discrimination
complaint with OCR).
90. The OCR website containing the April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
includes a "Know Your Rights" flyer that includes information about the OCR
complaint process. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Know Your Rights, ED.GOV,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/know.html. It is unclear, however, what
schools are supposed to do with this flyer, if anything. The Dear Colleague Letter
does not require that schools post the flyer.
91. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at i, iii, 5-6, 8, 10, 11, 14-15, 20-
22 (explaining the OCR complaint process); Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter],
at 9-12, 16.
92. Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault
Cases: Feeble Watchdog Leaves Students at Risk, Critics Say, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus
assault/articles/entry/1946/ [hereinafter Lax Enforcement of Title IX].
93. For more information about the FOIA process for LOFs, see Cantalupo,
Burying, supra note 1, at 236-9.
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which ones in particular, they must file a blanket FOIA request for all of
the LOFs in a particular timeframe, against a particular school, or similar
category. With the exception of a couple of recent cases, 94 the letters are
not available in ED's public FOIA reading room. Moreover, even though
the only way a member of the public can read the LOFs is through filing a
FOIA request, the request process is particularly lengthy for these
documents. This means that the vast majority of school officials will not
wait the months or expend the labor involved in filing and receiving results
from a blanket FOIA request that might not even contain a case that is on
point. Thus, while being investigated could lead schools to decriminalize
their responses to sexual violence, the unlikelihood of students' filing
complaints with OCR, coupled with the lack of public information
regarding the investigation results of the few complaints actually filed,
undercut OCR's intervention powers. In particular, although OCR's more
exacting "knew or should have known" standard has the potential to fix
some of the problems with the "actual knowledge" standard required in
private lawsuits, general ignorance about OCR's complaint process fails to
create incentives for schools to seek out knowledge of peer sexual
violence--or at the very least not to avoid that knowledge.
Therefore, both court and OCR's enforcement of Title IX provide mixed
incentives to schools with regard to their institutional responses. On the
back end, schools are encouraged to decriminalize their responses, but on
the front end, Title IX's enforcement structure encourages schools to keep
in place traditional law enforcement approaches to victim reporting.
B. The Clery Act
Like Title IX, the Clery Act deals with the rights of student survivors in
campus disciplinary proceedings, primarily through a set of provisions
referred to as the Campus Sexual Assault Victim's Bill of Rights
("CSAVBR"). 95 Unlike Title IX, Clery also deals with the front end,
reporting aspect of the campus sexual violence problem. However,
because, as its full title suggests, the Clery Act conceives of campus peer
sexual violence as merely one form of campus crime, its reporting
procedures unsurprisingly tend to encourage "criminalization" of
institutional responses. As such, it has been less effective than Title IX in
encouraging schools to use decriminalized reporting procedures on the
94. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Recent Resolutions, ED.GOV,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/index.html. These
recent cases are a positive step demonstrating this administration's recognition of
and willingness to address the problem, but these efforts are only beginning to
address the problem and past investigations prior to 2010 are not available in the
reading room.
95. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8) (2008).
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front end. It is also less effective than Title IX on the back end because
there is no right to private enforcement under Clery, so victims can only get
injunctive relief but no monetary compensation for Clery violations.96
Nevertheless, the enforcement of Clery, particularly with regard
CSAVBR, has been more protective of surviving students' rights than the
criminal justice system is, and violating the Clery Act can be still quite
expensive for schools, since ED has the power to fine schools for violating
Clery, whereas OCR has no fining capability. CSAVBR requires schools
to publish policies that inform both on-campus and off-campus
communities of the programs designed to prevent sexual violence provided
by the school, as well as the procedures in place to respond to sexual
violence once it occurs. It further specifies that a school's educational
programs should raise awareness of campus sexual violence. 98 Also,
procedures adopted to respond to such violence must include: procedures
and identifiable persons to whom to report; 99 the right of victims to notify
law enforcement and to get assistance from school officials in doing so;1oo
encouragement to victims and instructions as to how to preserve evidence
of sexual violence;'0o notification to students regarding options for
changing living and curricular arrangements and assistance in making those
changes;10 2 and student disciplinary procedures that explicitly treat both
accuser and accused equally in terms of their abilities "to have others
present" at hearings and to know the outcome of any disciplinary
proceeding.10 3
Probably the most visible case involving the Clery Act was the 2006
rape and murder of Laura Dickinson in her dormitory room at Eastern
Michigan University ("EMU") by a fellow student. The school initially
told Dickinson's family that her death involved "no foul play," then
informed the family over 2 months later of the arrest of the student since
convicted of raping and murdering her.'0 As a result of a complaint filed
96. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(C) (2008).
97. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(A) (2008).
98. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(i) (2008).
99. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iii) (2008).
100. 20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(v) (2008).
101.20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iii) (2008).
102.20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(vii) (2008).
103.20 USC § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iv) (2008).
104. See Joe Menard, EMU Slaying Probe Reopens Wounds, DETROIT NEWS
(May 10, 2007), available at http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20070510/METRO/705100402; Candice Williams, EMU Killer Denies
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against EMU for violations of the Clery Act,105 the school eventually
agreed to pay $350,000 in fines for 13 separate violations of the Clery Act,
the largest fine ever paid in a sexual violence case according to publicly
available information, and settled with Dickinson's family for $2.5
million. 10 6 The case eventually led to the President, Vice President for
Student Affairs and Director of Public Safety being fired, 07 and an
estimated $3.8 million in costs from the fines, the settlement with the
Dickinson family, and "severance packages, legal fees and penalties."' 08
Before EMU, the largest fine levied against a school was apparently
against Salem International University for $200,000. 109 In addition to not
reporting five sex offenses, SIU had violated CSAVBR by not regularly
providing counseling and other victim support services, "actively
discourag[ing victims] from reporting crimes to law enforcement or
seeking relief through the campus judicial system,"o and responding to
survivors' reports with "threats, reprisals, or both.""' Furthermore, the
school would not make accommodations for new living and academic
arrangements for victims following an assault, and survivors were
inadequately informed of their rights to pursue disciplinary action against
the assailant."12  Publicly available information indicates that the next
highest fine was $27,500 to Miami University of Ohio, " again for a
combination of underreporting various crimes, including sex offenses, and
"fail[ing] to initiate and enforce appropriate procedures for notifying both
parties of the outcome of any institutional disciplinary proceeding brought
105. See Joe Menard, EMU Faces Federal Complaint, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 7,
2007), available at http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070
307/SCHOOLS/703070426/1026.
106. See Geoff Larcom, Eastern Michigan University to Pay $350,000 in
Federal Fines Over Laura Dickinson Case, ANN ARBOR NEWS (June 06, 2008),
available at http://blog.mlive.com/annarbomews/2008/06/eastemmichigan
universityto.html.
107. See Marisa Schultz, EMU Murder Trial Begins Today, DETROIT NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20071015/SCHOOLS/710150361/1026/LOCAL.
108. Marisa Schultz, Controversy to Cost EMU $1M, DETROIT NEWS (July 19,
2007), available at http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2007
0719/SCHOOLS/707190389/1003/metro.
109. See Letter from John S. Loreng to Fred Zook (Dec. 17, 2001) at 7,
http://www.securityoncampus.org/pdf/SIUprdl.pdf [hereinafter SIU Letter].
I10. Id. at 16.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 22.
113. See Letter from Fran Susman & Gerald Sikora to James Garland (Sept.
11, 1997), http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=com-content&
view-article&id= 1 80.&Itemid=75
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alleging a sex offense."'1 14  Lastly, in 2000, Mount St. Clare College in
Clinton, Iowa, was the first school to be fined $25,000, in part for two
rapes that were reported to police but did not appear in the school's reports
since the perpetrators were never criminally charged. 15 As both the
provisions of CSAVBR and these four cases demonstrate, like Title IX but
unlike the criminal justice system, Clery gives sexual violence survivors'
procedural rights on par with accused students, and requires schools to
provide services to victims that are not contemplated in a criminal case.
Unfortunately, and despite Clery's attempts to the contrary, the
reporting system created by the statute does not similarly encourage
institutions to decriminalize their front end reporting-related responses to
sexual violence. The primary purpose of the Clery Act was to increase
transparency around campus crime so that prospective students and their
parents could make more knowledgeable decisions about which schools to
attend. n 6 Therefore, the Clery Act's focus is on establishing requirements
for schools to report and publish certain categories of crime that occur on
campus, including sex offenses. However, Clery's reporting requirements
do not adequately account for the differences between campus peer sexual
violence and other kinds of criminal activity. For instance, Clery adopts
definitions of criminal acts used in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook ("UCR Handbook"), which, up until
very recently defined forcible sex offenses as "carnal knowledge of a
female forcibly and against her will." 117  It also considers a crime
"reported"-and thus necessary for the institution to disclose-if it is
brought to the attention of a "campus security authority" or the local
114. Letter from S. Daniel Carter to Douglas Parrott (Oct. 7, 2004),
http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&
id= 179.&Itemid=75.
115. Donna Leinwand, Campus Crime Underreported: Colleges Have Been
Caught Misreporting Violence Statistics, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 2000, at 2A.
116. See H.R. REP. NO. H11499-01, at 1 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of
Rep. Gooding).
117. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING HANDBOOK 19 (rev. 2004), available at http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucr-publications/ucr handbook.pdf. Note that
the FBI has recently changed its definition to "[tihe penetration, no matter how
slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a
sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim." See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Press Release, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces Revisions to the
Uniform Crime Report's Definition of Rape, http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressreU
press-releases/attomey-general-eric-holder-announces-revisions-to-the-uniform-cri
me-reports-definition-of-rape.
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police," 8 but excludes faculty, campus physicians, or counselors (mental
health, professional and pastoral) from the definition of "campus security
authority."" 9 Even more fundamentally, Clery's approach draws from the
stranger rape myth discussed above. Institutions are required to report
crimes based on four factors: (1) where the crime occurred; (2) the type of
crime; (3) to whom the crime was reported; and (4) when the crime was
reported.12 0 Thus, rather than requiring an institution to count criminal acts
that take place between its students at any location, the Clery Act only
counts criminal acts occurring on school property. In doing so, it assumes
that an institution can protect students from sexual violence through its
control of facilities and traditional policing and security methods, such as
campus lighting (no dark alleys for those stranger rapists to hide) and blue
light phones (to get police protection when fleeing the stranger rapist). In
light of where, how, and at whose hands most campus sexual violence
actually occurs, this assumption is likely to spur institutions to adopt
ineffective traditional policing and security responses to the violence.
As a result, despite its greater focus than Title IX on the front end
reporting of sexual violence, Clery does no better-likely worse-than
Title IX in creating incentives for schools to develop decriminalized
reporting procedures. While it does encourage decriminalized back end
disciplinary procedures, its criminalized conception of reporting undercuts
the message of CSAVBR and the results of the four investigations
discussed above.
C. Due Process Rights of Accused Students
The case law regarding the due process rights of students accused of
conduct warranting suspension or expulsion from a public school further
supports the idea that colleges and universities are not required to imitate
the criminal justice system in structuring their student disciplinary
processes. This case law, of course, is not applicable to the front end
reporting structure because it only comes into play once a report has been
118. OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE
HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING 23 (2005), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf [hereinafter CAMPUS CRIME
REPORTING HANDBOOK]; OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING 73
(2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook-2.pdf
[hereinafter CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK]. See also 20
U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i).
119. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 51; CAMPUS
SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 77-78.
120. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 23; CAMPUS
SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 11.
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made, and the institution's disciplinary procedures are operating.
However, on the back end, the case law confirms that there are no legal
requirements that institutions treat accused students like criminal
defendants with the full panoply of due process rights to which criminal
defendants are constitutionally entitled.
All accused students have some due process rights; the variation is in
"what process is due.' 12' Although the Supreme Court has never decided a
case involving expulsion from a public institution, in Goss v. Lopez, the
court considered a 10-day suspension, without a hearing, of a group of
public high school students involved in a series of demonstrations and
protests. 122  The Court decided that the students were entitled to due
process consisting of "some kind of notice and [] some kind of hearing. 0
23
The Lopez Court also cited approvingly to Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education, where the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals defined what was
required for cases involving expulsion.12 4 In Dixon, a group of students
were expelled without a hearing from the Alabama State College for
Negroes for unspecified misconduct after they had all participated in a sit-
in at an all-white lunch counter and possibly had engaged in other civil
rights protests and demonstrations. 25 Dixon set forth the requirements for
due process before a state school can expel a student, including notice "of
the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify
expulsion,' 26 "the names of the witnesses... and an oral or written report
on the facts to which each witness testifies,"' 12 7 and a hearing, "[t]he nature
of [which] should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case.' 128 The hearing must provide "an opportunity to hear both sides in
considerable detail"' 29 and must give the accused student an opportunity to
present "his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral
testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf."' 3°  These
requirements fall short of "a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
cross-examine witnesses," 3 ' nor do they "require opportunit[ies] to secure
counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses... or to call... witnesses
to verify [the accused's] version of the incident.'
' 32
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 405 U.S. 951, 981 (1972).
122. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570 (1975).
123. Id. at 579.
124. Id. at 576.
125. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 152 (1961).
126. Id. at 158.
127. Idat 159.
128. Id. at 158.
129. Id. at 159.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583.
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For private institutions, the requirements are even less onerous. While
courts have reviewed private institutions for expelling or suspending
students in an arbitrary and capricious manner,'33 most courts review
private schools disciplinary actions under "the well settled rule that the
relations between a student and a private university are a matter of
contract." 34 Therefore, private institutions are mainly bound by what they
have promised students in the school's own policies and procedures, and
courts will review disciplinary actions according to the terms of the
contract. 3 5
In a representative selection of cases where students have challenged
expulsions,136 courts have steadfastly refused to intervene in school
disciplinary decisions as long as they are follow the minimal requirements
laid out by Lopez, Dixon and the school's own policies and procedures.
They have upheld expulsions for a wide range of student behaviors, from
smoking,137 drinking beer in the school parking lot'38 and engaging in
consensual sexual activity on school grounds,13 9 to participating in but
withdrawing, prior to discovery, from a conspiracy to shoot several
students and school officials, 4 0 and being found by two female students in
a dormitory room with two other male students and the female students'
roommate, who was inebriated, unconscious, and naked from the waist
down.141
133. See Ahlum v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 617 So. 2d 96, 100
(La. Ct. App. 1993); Coveney v. President & Trustees of Holy Cross College, 445
N.E.2d 136, 137 (Mass. 1983); Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of L., 258 N.W.2d
108, 112 (Minn. 1977); Rollins v. Cardinal Stritch Univ., 626 N.W.2d 464, 469
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
134. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
135. See Centre College v. Trzop, 127 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Ky. 2004); Schaer v.
Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000); Hernandez v. Don Bosco Prep.
High, 730 A.2d 365, 367 (N.J. 1999); Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F.
Supp. 238, 243 (D. Vt. 1994).
136. The cases discussed here were drawn mainly from 3-9 EDUCATION
LAW § 9.09, the section on student discipline law from an education law treatise.
They are not intended to be a comprehensive review of cases involving expulsion,
merely to give a sense of the range of student misconduct cases in which courts
have upheld expulsions.
137. See Flint v. St. Augustine High Sch., 323 So. 2d 229 (La. 1975).
138. See Covington County v. G.W., 767 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 2000).
139. See B.S. v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Ind. 2003).
140. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. Wis.
2002).
141. See Coveney, 445 N.E.2d 136. See also A.B. v. Slippery Rock Area Sch.
Dist., 906 A.2d 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (students leaving false bomb threat
notes in a school bathroom); Cloud v. Trustees of Boston University, 720 F.2d 721
(1st Cir. Mass. 1983) ("peeping" under women's skirts at a university library);
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In the sexual violence context, research for two articles dealing with this
subject has discovered only three cases where the court found a college or
university to have violated an accused student's due process rights and in
only one case did the court require the institution to pay any damages,14 2 a
small fraction of the amount for which the accused student asked, basically
amounting to a tuition refund. 14 3 However, in the rest of the cases reviewed
here, none has overturned a school's decision to sanction a student for peer
sexual violence. In contrast, they have rejected challenges to the
admissibility of certain witnesses and evidence,144 the right to know
witnesses' identities and to cross-examine them, 145 and the rights to an
attorney,146 discovery,147 voir dire,148 and appeal.149  They have also
Gaston v. Diocese of Allentown, 712 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) ("discipline
problems" which plaintiffs alleged were a pretext for retaliation against the
student's parents for objections they made to the school's curriculum); Flaim v.
Med. College of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. Ohio 2005) (attempted possession of
a controlled substance); Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1222
(S.D. Ala. 2000) (possession of marijuana); Rogers v. Gooding Pub. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 231 (in Re Rogers), 135 Idaho 480 (Idaho 2001) (possession of a pellet
gun); Brown v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Dist. 202, 500 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (brushing a teacher's buttocks with the back of a hand on two occasions);
Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. Ill. 1972) (attacking and
striking other students in the halls of the school); Hernandez, 730 A.2d 365
(engaging in a series of misbehavior including slashing a teacher's tires and selling
illegal steroids); S.K. v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 399 F. Supp.
2d 963 (D. Minn. 2005) (shooting a classmate in the back with a BB gun); Trzop,
127 S.W.3d 562 (possession of a gun in a college dormitory room).
142. See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 247. See also Marshall v. Maguire, 102
Misc. 2d 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Doe v. University of the South, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35166 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (denying summary judgment to school district for
possible failure to comply with own procedures in sexual assault case but refusing
to offer an "opinion as to whether a sexual assault occurred, whether any such acts
were consensual, or who, as between John Doe and the Complainant is credible.")
143. In September of 2011, John Doe was awarded $26,500 of the $5.5 million
for which he had asked, essentially a refund of his tuition, when the jury found the
university had not breached its contract with Doe but was fifty-three percent at
fault (in comparison to Doe's forty-seven percent fault) in his negligence claim.
Todd South, Jury finds Sewanee and student at fault; awards student $26,500,
TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 3, 2011), available at http://timesfreepress.com/
news/201 1/sep/03/jury-finds-sewanee-and-student-fault-awards-50000-/.
144. See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 380; Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724; Brands v.
Sheldon Community School, 671 F. Supp. 627, 632 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
145. See B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 899; Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified Sch.
Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Gomes v. Univ. of Maine Sys.,
365 F. Supp. 2d 6,23 (D. Me. 2005).
146. See Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 140; Ahlun, 617 So. 2d at 100.
147. See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
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allowed a victim to testify behind a screen,1 50 and have consistently
reiterated the distinction between disciplinary hearings and criminal
proceedings.' 51
Moreover, these cases demonstrate that schools may even take actions
prior to notice and a hearing without running afoul of due process
requirements. Indeed, Lopez itself acknowledges that it might be necessary
for a school to act quickly and prior to notice and a hearing under certain
circumstances: "Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to
persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process
may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary
notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable."
152
Courts have relied on this language to allow schools to take measures
protecting victims and accusers, including allowing them to submit witness
statements instead of appearing at the hearing,' 53 protecting them from
retaliation, 5 4 and, in cases of peer sexual violence, suspending or otherwise
separating accused students prior to notice and a hearing. 1
55
148. See id. at 32.
149. See id. at 33.
150. See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724; Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
151. See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 381 ("A university is not required to adhere to
the standards of due process guaranteed to criminal defendants or to abide by rules
of evidence adopted by courts"); Granowitz v. Redlands Unified School Dist., 105
Cal. App. 4th 349, 355 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2003) ("Courts have consistently
refused to impose stricter, adversarial, "trial-like procedures and proof' on public
school suspension proceedings"); Ray v. Wilmington College, 106 Ohio App. 3d
707, 712 (Ohio Ct. App., Clinton County 1995) ("The issue here is not whether
Wilmington could have provided Ray with a better hearing, nor whether the
hearing satisfied the requirements of a formal trial."); Brands, 671 F. Supp. at 632
("The Due Process Clause does not require courtroom standards of evidence to be
used in administrative hearings"); Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 17 ("The courts
ought not to extol form over substance, and impose on educational institutions all
the procedural requirements of a common law criminal trial").
152. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 582-3.
153. See Coplin, 903 F. Supp. 1383; B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 899; Gomes, 365
F. Supp. 2d at 23.
154. See B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 901 ("FWCS has a strong interest in
protecting students who report classmate misconduct. Those students may be
understandably reluctant to come forward with information if they are faced
with... the unsettling prospect of ostracism or even physical reprisals at the hands
of their peers").
155. See Brands, 671 F. Supp. at 629 (suspending a student's eligibility in the
state wrestling tournament prior to a hearing, after he and three other males
"engaged in multiple acts of sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female
student"); J.S. v. Isle of Wight County Sch. Bd, 362 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677-78 (E.D.
Va. 2005) (student who sexually assaulted a younger, female student in the girls
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These cases clearly demonstrate that courts do not require schools to
treat accused students like criminal defendants. Moreover, this makes total
sense in light of the different powers and goals of student disciplinary
proceedings. As these precedents implicitly acknowledge, the deprivations
of property involved in a school expulsion are not comparable to sending
someone to jail and potentially requiring registration as a sex offender. In
fact, schools lack even much less coercive powers such as the subpoena.
To the extent that high standards of proof, the treatment of the victim as a
complaining witness as opposed to a party, and unequal rights to discovery
and disclosures of evidence are all procedural protections provided in the
criminal context because of the state's coercive powers, it is inappropriate
to copy them wholesale in a context where those coercive powers are not
present.
Instead, as "best practices" literature in the student discipline area
already acknowledges,156 the goals of a school in conducting student
disciplinary proceedings are quite different. As one author explains, the
central goal of student disciplinary systems is helping "to create the best
environment in which students can live and learn... [a]t the cornerstone [of
which] is the obligation of students to treat all other members of the
academic community with dignity and respect-including other students,
faculty members, neighbors, and employees."' 5 7  He reminds school
administrators and lawyers that this goal means that "student victims are
just as important as the student who allegedly misbehaved" (emphasis in
original),'5 8 a principle that "is critical" to resolving "[c]ases of student-on-
student violence."' 5 9 In doing so, he points out that this principle of
treating all students equally "creates a far different system than a criminal
system in which the rights of a person facing jail time are superior to those
of a crime victim." 6 0  Therefore, he advises that student disciplinary
systems use the "'more likely than not' standard [of proof] used in civil
situations" and avoid describing student disciplinary matters with language
restroom suspended prior to notice and a hearing, transferred by the school to
another school after an administrative hearing, and not allowed to return after the
appeal hearing); Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (D. Utah 1999)
("given the pattern of misbehavior and continual threat being posed by C.J. to other
students, Principal Reeves may have been justified in immediately suspending C.J.
without the requisite notice of the charges and opportunity to explain").
156. See generally EDWARD N. STONER II, REVIEWING YOUR STUDENT
DISCIPLINE POLICY: A PROJECT WORTH THE INVESTMENT (2000), available at:
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED444074.pdf.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id
159. Id. at 7-8.
160. Id. at 7.
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drawn from the criminal system. 161
Thus, the need to decriminalize institutional responses to student
misconduct, including peer sexual violence, is widely acknowledged, even
when the focus is upon the rights of the student accused of misconduct.
When combined with the requirements of Title IX and the Clery Act with
regard to victims' rights in disciplinary proceedings, the mandate, both
legal and policy-based, that institutions decriminalize their responses to
sexual violence is clear in terms of the institutions' back end responses
once a report is filed. Moreover, the best practices literature provides
specific strategies and recommendations for institutions to use in the
decriminalization process. 62 However, because the due process precedents
and best practices literature regarding student disciplinary systems provide
no additional insight into the front end victim-reporting problem, and Title
IX and the Clery Act deal with that problem inadequately, we still need to
generate some methods for decriminalizing the reporting process. The next
and final section of this article turns to that task.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECRIMINALIZING REPORTING
Because of the Clery Act's focus on reporting as well as the number of
amendments that have been made to it since it was first passed, we should
start on the decriminalization process by amending the Clery Act to enable
two new approaches to the sexual violence and victim-non-reporting
problems.163 In fact, a recent set of amendments to Clery were proposed in
the 112th Congress via the SaVE Act,164 so additional changes to Clery are
on the table, presenting a good moment to add these methods to the list of
changes already being proposed. Alternatively, these approaches might be
adopted through new regulations under either Clery or Title X.
The first approach is to require schools to collect information about
campus peer sexual violence (and any other violent criminal behavior with
similar non-reporting problems) in a manner more likely to produce useful
information that will both make it impossible for a campus to avoid
161. Id. at 10.
162. For more information about best practices and recommendations of
additional ways to decriminalize disciplinary proceedings, see Cantalupo, Campus
Violence, supra note 1, at 665-90.
163. Other recommendations regarding improving both Title IX and Clery's
address of the sexual violence and non-reporting problem can be found in
Cantalupo, Burying, supra note 1, at 252-66 , but the ones discussed here have the
greatest potential to both decriminalize the reporting structure and deal effectively
with the reporting-related disincentives discussed at length in that article.
164. S. 834, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 2016, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); Lauren Siebin, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for Colleges' Sexual-
Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Apr. 15, 2011, at A20-21.
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(passively or actively) knowledge of peer sexual violence and provide the
school with the information it needs to address the violence problem
properly. More specifically, schools should be required to administer a
standard survey developed by ED or a contractor working for ED every
four years (or a similarly appropriate interval) via a method that would
guarantee a high response rate (e.g., requiring a response to the survey in
order to graduate or to register for classes). The survey would ask students
questions designed to determine the incidence of sexual violence without
depending on individual survivors to come forward to report, and schools
would submit results of the survey to ED and publish it in the campus
crime report. The ED could also do statistical comparisons of survey
results from schools and, ideally, make those available to the public. Many
schools already participate voluntarily in similar surveys, which often
include such compilations, and are given to schools confidentially for their
own use. 165 Schools generally use information from these surveys to
inform themselves of what students are experiencing and to develop
policies and programs for responding to those experiences. 166 As helpful as
such surveys can be, even with a comparatively small group of schools
participating, 167 imagine the wealth of information about students that
165. Some schools conduct surveys on the incidence of sexual violence on
their particular campus. For example, the American College Health Association
offers the American College Health Assessment, which includes questions related
to sexual violence. About ACHA-NCHA, AM. COLL. HEALTH Ass'N-NAT'L COLL.
HEALTH ASSESSMENT, http://www.acha-ncha.org/overview.html. However, the
school-specific information collected by the surveys is generally not made publicly
available. Nevertheless, aggregate data made available to the public and school-
specific survey results shared confidentially by officials at some schools confirm a
consistent incidence rate at individual campuses, subsets of campuses, and nation-
wide. Publications and Reports, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL.
HEALTH ASSESSMENT II, http://www.acha-ncha.org/reportsACHA-NCHAII.html.
166. For instance, the American College Health Association's National
College Health Assessment states as the survey's purpose: "[e]nabling both ACHA
and institutions of higher education to adequately identify factors affecting
academic performance, respond to questions and concerns about the health of the
nation's students, develop a means to address these concerns, and ultimately
improve the health and welfare of those students." National College Health
Assessment, AM. COLL. HEALTH Ass'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT,
http://www.acha-ncha.org/.
167. About 40-140 schools per semester participated in the National College
Health Assessment in the two most recently surveyed full academic years (2008-
2009 and 2009-2010), with a total of about 180-200 schools participating per
academic year. Like proposed here, the National College Health Assessment does
not appear to be administered every year by all participating schools. Participation
History, AM. COLL. HEALTH Ass'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT,
http://www.acha-ncha.org/partic-history.html.
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schools and the public could obtain from a survey in which all schools must
participate.
Because such a survey would not depend on a traditional policing
model, it would solve or bypass a number of difficulties that plague the
current traditional system, including both the perception and the reality of
police or school officials who are hostile or otherwise lack expertise in the
dynamics of sexual violence. A survey would essentially remove the
institution from its current "middle-man" position, where students report to
the institution and then the institution reports to the public, and would
enable students to report directly to the public what is happening among
students on every campus across the country. School officials would
receive campus-specific information that is easily comparable to national
incidence rates.
In addition, because such a survey would be required of all schools, it
would remove an ethical dilemma for schools that is created by the large
victim non-reporting problem. That is, when a school creates better
responses to victim reporting and survivors begin to report the violence as a
result, a strange thing happens: the campus suddenly looks like it has a
serious crime problem. In fact, what is known about the problem indicates
that every campus currently has this serious crime problem at a similar rate,
a rate that tracks the national incidence. 168 The non-reporting phenomenon
and how it is created, however, means that the schools that ignore the
problem have fewer reports and look more safe, whereas the schools that
encourage victim reporting have more reports and look less safe.
Appearances in this case are completely the opposite of reality, and the
correct conclusion to draw from the number of reports of peer sexual
violence on a campus is entirely counterintuitive. Therefore, institutions
must decide whether to seek to end the violence by encouraging victim
reporting and by otherwise openly acknowledging the problem, thereby
risking developing a reputation as a dangerous campus, or to ignore the
problem, thus discouraging victim reporting either passively or actively and
appearing to be less dangerous. Moreover, if the campus next door or
across town or one step below or above in the rankings chooses to ignore
the problem, its choice could translate into a competitive disadvantage for
the institution seeking to increase reporting. All schools conducting the
168. Some schools do conduct surveys like the American College Health
Assessment on the incidence of sexual violence on their particular campus.
Although the school-specific information collected by the surveys is generally not
made publicly available from such surveys, aggregate data made available to the
public, as well as school-specific survey results shared confidentially with this
author by officials at some schools, confirm a consistent incidence rate at
individual campuses, subsets of campuses, and nation-wide. Publications and
Reports, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT II,
http://www.acha-ncha.org/reportsACHA-NCHAII.html.
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same survey removes this competitive advantage and, with it, any
incentives created by it to discourage victim reporting. 69
The second method by which to decriminalize reporting, which ideally
would be combined with the survey discussed above, is to require
institutions to create certain programs related to peer sexual violence and
then to funnel reporting through those programs. For instance, one of the
most effective ways of addressing the myriad challenges related to campus
peer sexual violence is to create a visible (yet confidential) and centralized
victims' services office, a method which has received increasing
recognition as a best practice for responding to campus peer sexual
violence. 70
A victims' services office can help with reporting by acting as a central
location for both services and reports. Such offices are generally more
trusted by survivors than traditional law enforcement or other school
officials, in part because they can provide survivors with a "one-stop shop"
for the various academic, medical, counseling and advocacy needs of
victims. One can picture a campus student services system for sexual
violence victims as a metaphorical wheel, with a victims' services office at
the hub of the wheel and the various places where a student might initially
report at the ends of the wheel spokes. These places could include the
medical center, campus police, counseling services, residence life,
individual faculty, the student conduct office, etc. This wheel-like structure
allows the offices where a student initially reports immediately to refer the
student to the victims' services office. That office could likewise refer
students out to the different offices from which they can get needed
services, thus alleviating a victim's need to go from office to office trying
to figure out the system on her own.
The victims' services office can also provide a source of expertise in an
area where schools need a lot more information and training, especially in
light of the training requirements and education recommendations
contained in the April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, which will be
strengthened further by the Campus SaVE Act, should it be enacted into
169. For more information on this dilemma and other "information problems"
affecting schools' responses to campus peer sexual violence, see Cantalupo,
Burying, supra note 1, at 219-23.
170. See, e.g., HEATHER KARJANE ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: How
AMERICA'S INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND 132 (2002) (noting a
dedicated, on-campus victim services office as an "encouraging practice"); OVW
FISCAL YEAR 2011 GRANTS (mandating that no less than twenty percent of the
funds granted to a school to combat sexual assault, stalking and domestic and
dating violence go towards a victim services program where no on-campus or off-
campus program currently exists).
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law."' Office staff would have the background and knowledge to
implement such training and education programs and could provide deeper
expertise in active cases. Faculty and staff could be minimally trained in
how to handle reports, mainly by referring them to the victims' services
office as the campus expert, which usually is a relief to the majority of
faculty and staff members who do not feel prepared to deal with such
reports. Survivors would also be more likely to report to a confidential
advocate and all-around resource, and such an office could provide raw
numbers without breaching confidentiality. Centralizing reports with a
victims' services office is one of the most effective ways of both getting
survivors to report and making sure an institution's response is effective
once a report occurs.
1 72
In light of the benefits of such offices, the most effective way for the
Clery Act to both capture reports and ensure that sexual violence survivors'
rights are protected (as required by the CSAVBR portion of the Clery Act)
may very well be to mandate that every school create and professionally
staff such an office. Such an approach would not only increase reporting,
but would also provide an on-campus expert who would facilitate creation
of the right policies and procedures, as well as preventive educational
programming. A legal regime that truly wants to end the campus peer
sexual violence problem could not do better than mandating such an office
at every school.
Neither the survey nor victim services office necessarily need to replace
the Clery Act's current reporting structure, although it is worth considering
whether the resources that schools and other entities put toward meeting the
Clery Act's current requirements would be more efficiently and effectively
utilized to fund one of these methods. Alternatively, any amendments to
the Clery Act could appropriate money for ED to design the survey and
compile and analyze the data, giving schools the less resource intensive
role of administering the survey and collecting the data, which might be
made quite easy if, for instance, ED were to design a survey method that
was electronic and automated. The design might also include questions,
like the voluntary American College Health Association survey currently
does, that deal with other important topics about which schools want to
assess their students' experiences. Moreover, with the majority of the
expenses of designing and administering the survey removed from
institution itself, schools could put the resources formerly used for campus
crime reporting towards the victim services office.
171. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note TK, at 4, 7, 12, 14-15; S. 834, 112th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 2016, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011);
172. For more information regarding the role that victims' services offices can
play once a survivor comes forward, see Cantalupo, Campus Violence, supra note
1, at 681-2.
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Adopting both of these methods is ultimately in the interests of schools,
given the potentially very expensive liability that schools face under Title
IX, in particular. The Title IX liability scheme gives schools a clear
incentive to get their institutional responses to campus peer sexual violence
right. Although schools could keep their current "criminalized" approaches
in place and continue to avoid knowledge of the problem generally and
individual cases specifically, they would do so at their own-and at
significant-risk. In addition, proper institutional responses present the
best hope for schools to address the problem and prevent it from happening
in the first place, by breaking the cycle of non-reporting and violence,
gathering enough campus-specific information about the problem to create
other forms of prevention, and bringing in expert victims' services
professionals to inform and implement best prevention and response
practices. Aside from wanting to do the right thing and prevent the
violence from an altruistic standpoint, violence prevention and effective
institutional responses also save schools from many of the difficulties and
resource expenditures that specific cases can involve when schools are
unprepared to deal with them. Finally, schools seeking to address the
violence problem would not be faced with the competitive disadvantage
dilemma created by the high rate of violence but low rate of victim
reporting.
III. CONCLUSION
If colleges and universities are ever going to end, or even significantly
diminish, the distressingly high and persistent incidence of peer sexual
violence on their campuses, they must decriminalize their institutional
responses to the violence. While Title IX, the Clery Act and case law
regarding the due process rights of students accused of misconduct
warranting suspension or expulsion make it clear that schools should not be
treating student disciplinary proceedings like criminal trials, they assume a
traditional policing, criminal justice approach to victim-reporting. This
assumption significantly diminishes the effectiveness of both these laws
and an institution's responses to sexual violence because they perpetuate a
high victim non-reporting rate that is likely caused in large part by
survivors' documented fear and distrust of law enforcement's and other
school officials' attitudes towards survivors. Therefore, institutions should
be seeking not only to decriminalize their disciplinary procedures on the
back end of a student's progress through a school response system, but also
to decriminalize their reporting mechanisms on the front end. Amending
the Clery Act or passing new regulations under Title IX or Clery could
provide two ways to decriminalize reporting: first by mandating that all
institutions conduct a regular, national survey on sexual violence among
their students and second by requiring institutions to create victims'
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services offices which will centralize reporting and service provision as
well as serve as an expert for training and education purposes.
